Chinese Experience in Controlling the Abuse of Dominant Market Position on Digital Platforms and Suggestions for Improving Vietnamese Law

Abstract: In the context of the rapid development of the digital economy, digital platforms increasingly hold significant market power, which raises the risk of abusing dominant market positions and generating negative impacts on the competitive environment. This article analyzes the theoretical foundations and legal framework related to the abuse of dominant market position by digital platform enterprises. It also examines China’s experience in controlling abusive practices of platform companies, including the improvement of competition law, the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, and the application of regulatory measures concerning data and algorithms. Based on this analysis, the article draws several lessons for Vietnam to improve its legal framework on competition in the digital environment, enhance the effectiveness of controlling the market power of digital platforms, and ensure a fair and healthy competitive environment.

Keyword: Digital platforms; Dominant market position, Relevant market; Competition.

I.

Theoretical and Legal Foundations of the Abuse of Dominant Market Position on Digital Platforms

1.1. The Concept and Identification of Dominant Market Position

In a market economy, competition among enterprises does not always take place on equal terms, as some enterprises may possess superior market power. It is in this context that the concept of “dominant market position” emerged to describe a situation in which an undertaking is capable of exerting significant influence over prices, output, or trading conditions. In the Treaty Establishing the European Community (1957), “dominant position” is referred to in the context of regulating the abuse of such a position. Accordingly, the Treaty prohibits the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it, insofar as such conduct may affect trade between Member States[1]. However, the Treaty does not provide a specific definition of “dominant position”; rather, it employs the concept as the basis for applying the prohibition while listing typical forms of abusive conduct. The substantive meaning of this concept has been developed primarily through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), particularly in later judgments such as Continental Can (1972), in which the Court affirmed that “conduct may constitute an abuse of a dominant position even without proof of subjective fault if an undertaking possessing market power engages in conduct that eliminates, or almost eliminates, competition, thereby substantially restricting consumers’ freedom of choice in the market, and such conduct is sufficient to constitute an abuse”[2]. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position but does not define the concept of dominant position. In their decision-making practice, the institutions of the European Union have established that “a dominant market position is a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained in the relevant market and to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently of its competitors, customers and, ultimately, consumers”[3]. In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court of Justice of the European Union formulated a definition of dominant market position that continues to be applied today: A dominant position is a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained in the relevant market by affording it the power to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, consumers. Such a position does not preclude the existence of some degree of competition, as in the case of a monopoly; rather, it enables the undertaking to benefit from its position by allowing it, if not to determine, then at least to exert a significant influence over the conditions under which competition develops and, in any event, to act to a large extent without regard to competitive constraints, provided that such conduct does not ultimately operate to its own detriment[4].

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Model Law on Competition 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Model Law on Competition)[5] defines dominance as a central criterion for assessing anti-competitive conduct: “Dominance refers to a situation where an enterprise, either by itself or acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to control a relevant market for a particular good or service, or groups of goods or services”[6]. By contrast, United States competition law does not provide a definition of dominant position but instead focuses on the concept of monopoly power. The concept of monopoly is primarily governed by Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890[7]. In the United States, monopoly power is generally understood as the power to control prices and exclude competition. These two elements are closely intertwined and have been treated by the Supreme Court of the United States as an integrated concept. Unlike EU competition law on the abuse of a dominant position, which provides detailed guidance on defining the relevant market and on enforcement priorities in the application of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings, United States law contains no comparable guidance. Instead, U.S. antitrust law has been developed primarily through a line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the federal courts of appeals[8]. Under United States law, monopoly is therefore understood principally through the concepts of monopoly power and the abuse of such power.

In China, dominant market position is regulated under the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (2007), as amended in 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the Anti-Monopoly Law). Article 22 provides that a dominant market position refers to a market position held by an undertaking that enables it to control the price or quantity of commodities or other trading conditions in the relevant market, or to impede or affect the ability of other undertakings to enter the relevant market[9]. In addition, the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that the determination of whether an undertaking holds a dominant market position is based on a combination of quantitative criteria relating to market share and qualitative factors reflecting its actual economic strength. Specifically, an undertaking may be deemed to hold a dominant market position where it has the ability to control prices, output, or trading conditions, taking into account such factors as its financial position and the degree of dependence of other business operators on that undertaking in commercial transactions. In quantitative terms, the Law establishes rebuttable presumptions of dominance based on the following market share thresholds: (1) a single undertaking is presumed to hold a dominant market position where it accounts for one-half of the relevant market; (2) two undertakings are presumed to hold a dominant market position where their combined market share accounts for two-thirds of the relevant market; and (3) three undertakings are presumed to hold a dominant market position where their combined market share accounts for three-fourths of the relevant market. In the circumstances specified in subparagraphs (2) or (3) above, where the market share of any of the undertakings is less than one-tenth, that undertaking shall not be presumed to hold a dominant market position[10]. However, even where an undertaking meets the statutory thresholds set out above, it may present evidence demonstrating that it does not hold a dominant market position. In such a case, the undertaking shall not be regarded as holding a dominant market position.

In addition, Article 5 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the Protection of Competition 2006 (as amended in 2024) provides that an undertaking (or a group of undertakings) is deemed to hold a dominant position where it possesses sufficient market power in a particular goods market to exercise a dominant influence over that market, namely by determining or significantly influencing prices, quantities, or general trading conditions; eliminating or weakening competitors, thereby making it difficult or impossible for other undertakings to continue operating in the market; or preventing other undertakings from entering the market, thereby making market entry difficult or costly[11]. In other words, an undertaking is not required to hold a complete monopoly; it may be regarded as holding a dominant position where it possesses sufficient market power to control or significantly influence the operation of the market.

While the competition laws of many jurisdictions use only one of the two terms, “dominant market position” or “monopoly,” to describe the same legal phenomenon, Vietnamese competition law adopts a different approach by drawing a clear distinction between these two concepts. Under the current Vietnamese competition law, both undertakings holding a dominant market position and monopoly undertakings are recognized as entities possessing substantial market power, with the capacity to produce anti-competitive effects through their conduct[12]. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Law on Competition 2018, an undertaking or a group of undertakings may be determined to hold a dominant market position or a monopoly position based on its market power and market share in the relevant market. Specifically, an undertaking is deemed to hold a dominant market position where it possesses substantial market power as prescribed in Article 26 of the Law on Competition 2018, or where it holds a market share of 30% or more in the relevant market. With respect to a group of undertakings, a dominant market position is established where the undertakings jointly engage in conduct that causes anti-competitive effects and possess substantial market power, or where their combined market share reaches the prescribed thresholds, namely: 50% or more for two undertakings, 65% or more for three undertakings, 75% or more for four undertakings, and 85% or more for five or more undertakings in the relevant market; however, undertakings with a market share of less than 10% are excluded from the calculation. In addition, pursuant to Article 25, an undertaking is deemed to hold a monopoly position where no other undertaking competes with it in respect of the goods or services that it supplies in the relevant market. Accordingly, an undertaking is considered to hold a monopoly position only where there is no other undertaking in the relevant market supplying goods or services that directly compete with those supplied by that undertaking. This indicates that a monopoly reflects a market structure characterized by the complete absence of competition. By contrast, where an undertaking holds a dominant market position, although it has the ability to exercise significant influence over and control the market, competing undertakings continue to exist in the market, and a certain degree of competition is maintained.

Although competition law regimes differ in their approaches, they share a common understanding of a “dominant market position” as reflecting the substantial market power of an undertaking, enabling that undertaking or a group of undertakings to control, or to produce anti-competitive effects in, the relevant market. Nevertheless, certain differences remain. While the competition laws of the European Union, China, Russia, and Vietnam all recognize the concept of a “dominant position”, combining such criteria as the ability to control the market, impede competition, and, in many cases, quantitative market share thresholds giving rise to presumptions of dominance, United States competition law does not employ this concept. Instead, it adopts the concept of “monopoly power”, emphasizing two core elements – the power to control prices and to exclude competition – which has been developed primarily through case law.

1.2. Concept of Abuse of a Dominant Market Position

The mere fact that an undertaking holds a dominant market position does not necessarily mean that it has engaged in an abuse of a dominant market position. The UNCTAD Model Law on Competition emphasizes that: “The mere possession of a dominant position of market power is not anti-competitive, nor is the acquisition of such a position through competition on the merits”[13]. Rather, conduct that results in “(i) reduced output and higher prices; (ii) reduced quality and variety of services/products; or (iii) reduced innovation”[14] is regarded as anti-competitive conduct and is subject to legal sanctions. In other words, the law neither regulates nor penalizes the mere attainment of a dominant market position. Whether adverse legal consequences arise depends on the purposes for which the undertaking exercises its dominant position and whether its conduct has positive or negative effects on the market. Accordingly, the focus of competition law is not on the existence of a dominant market position itself, but on the anti-competitive effects arising from the abuse of market power. The judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission is one of the landmark cases in European competition law concerning the abuse of a dominant market position. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG, a major vitamin manufacturer in Europe, was found by the European Commission to hold a dominant position in several vitamin markets, including vitamins A, B2, B6, C, E, and H. Roche entered into agreements with its customers requiring them to purchase all or most of their requirements from Roche and granted loyalty rebates to retain those customers. The European Commission considered these practices to be anti-competitive and imposed sanctions[15]. In its judgment, the Court defined an abuse of a dominant position as conduct which, “through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition”[16].

In Vietnam, competition law establishes a legal framework for controlling the abuse of a dominant market position. Pursuant to Clause 5, Article 3 of the Law on Competition 2018, the abuse of a dominant market position or a monopoly position is defined as conduct by an undertaking holding a dominant market position or a monopoly position that causes or is capable of causing anti-competitive effects[17]. Clause 1, Article 27 of the Law on Competition 2018 prohibits undertakings or groups of undertakings holding a dominant market position from engaging in the following conduct: (1) selling goods or supplying services below total cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors; (2) imposing unreasonable purchase or selling prices for goods or services, or imposing minimum resale prices that cause harm to customers; (3) restricting the production or distribution of goods or services, or limiting the market, in a manner that causes harm to customers; (4) applying dissimilar commercial conditions to equivalent transactions, thereby creating inequality in competition; (5) imposing conditions on other undertakings in the conclusion of contracts, requiring them to accept obligations that are not directly related to the subject matter of the contract; (6) preventing other undertakings from entering or expanding in the market; and (7) imposing disadvantageous conditions on customers or abusing the dominant market position to cause harm to customers[18]. Accordingly, Vietnamese competition law does not prohibit an undertaking from holding a dominant market position; rather, it prohibits the abuse of that position to engage in conduct that distorts competition or causes harm to competitors or consumers.

It can therefore be observed that competition laws across jurisdictions do not prohibit undertakings from attaining a dominant market position. Instead, they prohibit the abuse of such a position through conduct that undermines the normal functioning of competition in the market.

1.3. Consequences of the Abuse of a Dominant Market Position

The abuse of a dominant market position gives rise to numerous adverse effects on a healthy competitive environment as well as on the efficient functioning of the market. These effects not only harm competing undertakings but also cause direct harm to consumers and the overall development of the economy.

First, it reduces or eliminates competition in the market. When an undertaking holding a dominant market position uses its market power to engage in conduct such as selling goods or supplying services below cost in order to eliminate competitors, imposing unfair trading conditions, or preventing other undertakings from entering the market, competing undertakings may encounter difficulties in maintaining and expanding their business operations. This may result in the exclusion of many small or newly established undertakings from the market, thereby reducing the number of market participants and causing the market structure to become less competitive.

Second, it causes harm to consumers. Where competition is restricted, a dominant undertaking may impose unreasonably high selling prices, restrict output, reduce the quality of goods or services, or impose disadvantageous trading conditions on customers. In the absence of effective competition from other undertakings, consumers have fewer choices and are compelled to accept the trading conditions imposed by the dominant undertaking, thereby reducing consumer welfare.

Third, it distorts the functioning of the market mechanism. Competition is an essential mechanism for ensuring the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. However, when an undertaking abuses its dominant market position to maintain its market power, market signals such as prices and supply and demand may be distorted. As a result, the allocation of resources no longer accurately reflects market demand, thereby reducing the efficiency of the economy.

Fourth, it creates barriers to market entry for new undertakings. Conduct such as entering into exclusive agreements, controlling distribution networks, or imposing unfair trading conditions may make it difficult for new undertakings to gain access to customers or sources of supply. This limits the ability of new market participants to enter the market, making the market less dynamic and reducing the level of competition necessary for its effective functioning.

Fifth, it weakens incentives for innovation and technological development. In a healthy competitive market, undertakings are generally required to innovate continuously, improve technology, and enhance the quality of their products in order to maintain their market position. However, where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power to preserve its position without facing significant competitive pressure, incentives for innovation may be diminished, thereby adversely affecting the long-term development of both the market and the economy.

From the foregoing analysis, it can be seen that the abuse of a dominant market position not only undermines healthy competition but also adversely affects consumer interests and the stable and efficient development of the market.

II. Identifying the Abuse of a Dominant Market Position in Digital Platform Markets

2.1. Characteristics of Digital Platform Markets

The emergence of digital platforms is a defining feature of the digital economy. Broadly defined, a digital platform is a space in which social and economic interactions take place online, typically through applications. Digital platforms are multisided digital frameworks that shape the way in which different participants interact with one another[19]. Digital platforms vary considerably in both their functions and structures. Early pioneering platforms have fundamentally transformed numerous industries, including retail, tourism, and transportation. Notable examples include Amazon, Salesforce, Uber, Google, and Facebook, which serve not only as platforms providing services such as online search and social networking, but also as infrastructure upon which other platforms can be developed[20]. On digital platforms, business entities may conduct commercial activities, while the platform functions as an intermediary facilitating interactions between producers and end consumers[21]. In the context of digital transformation and the rapid development of the Internet, digital platform markets have emerged with characteristics that differ significantly from those of traditional markets.

Digital platforms typically operate within a multi-sided market structure, in which the platform serves as an intermediary connecting multiple groups of users, such as sellers, buyers, and advertisers, rather than relying solely on the direct transactional relationship between sellers and buyers that characterizes traditional markets. According to an OECD study, a multi-sided platform is an intermediary economic platform that connects two or more distinct groups of users, with each group generating network effects for the others. Consequently, indirect network effects may arise, meaning that the value of the platform to one group of users depends on the number of participants on the other side of the platform. As one side of the platform attracts more users, the platform becomes more valuable to the other side, which in turn tends to attract additional users. This self-reinforcing process continues over time, enabling the platform to expand further[22]. Digital platform markets also exhibit characteristics that distinguish them from traditional markets. Most notably, their multi-sided structure connects multiple groups of users and generates network effects; digital technologies significantly reduce transaction and information search costs; undertakings and consumers can interact without geographical constraints; and data and algorithms play a pivotal role in creating competitive advantages. These characteristics make digital platform markets more susceptible to high levels of market concentration and the accumulation of substantial market power, while simultaneously creating new challenges for the application of competition law. Accordingly, the distinctive structure and operating mechanisms of digital platform markets present new challenges for assessing market power and applying competition law in the digital economy.

Vietnamese law has also introduced the concept of a digital platform in order to establish a legal basis for state management of the digital business environment. Specifically, Clause 2, Article 3 of the Law on Electronic Commerce 2025 provides that “an electronic commerce platform is a digital platform established for the purpose of conducting electronic commerce activities”[23]. The Law further classifies electronic commerce platforms into the following categories: direct electronic commerce platforms, intermediary electronic commerce platforms, social networking platforms engaging in electronic commerce activities, and integrated electronic commerce platforms. In particular, pursuant to Clause 3, Article 3: “a direct electronic commerce platform is a platform established by an organization or an individual for the direct sale of goods or the direct provision of services”[24], meanwhile, under Clause 4, Article 3, “an intermediary electronic commerce platform is a platform that allows other entities to register accounts in order to introduce, sell goods, or provide services on that platform”[25]. This classification is of particular significance for the study of the abuse of a dominant market position in digital platform markets, as intermediary platforms often possess the ability to control data, user traffic, and the accessibility of customers for business entities that depend on the platform. Consequently, such platforms are more likely to engage in anti-competitive conduct, including imposing unfair trading conditions, giving preferential visibility to the platform’s own products, or restricting competitors’ access to the market. Furthermore, the Law on Electronic Commerce 2025 imposes a number of obligations on digital platform operators, including the establishment of an online complaint-handling system[26], the implementation of mechanisms for reviewing and removing unlawful information, and the obligation to provide data and descriptions of algorithms at the request of competent state authorities[27].

These provisions demonstrate that the approach adopted by Vietnamese law extends beyond the regulation of electronic commerce activities and is gradually establishing a legal framework for controlling the market power of digital platforms and preventing the abuse of such power.

2.2. Common Forms of Abuse of a Dominant Market Position in Digital Platform Markets

New forms of the abuse of a dominant market position are increasingly being identified, particularly those associated with the digital environment. Some of the most common forms of the abuse of a dominant market position in digital platform markets include the following:

First, refusing competitors access to essential infrastructure or data. In digital markets, essential infrastructure is no longer limited to railways, electricity, or telecommunications networks, as in traditional competition, but also includes Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), platform data (such as user data, usage data, and clickstream data), application stores (such as the App Store and Google Play), as well as payment, login, and advertising services. This conduct arises where a large undertaking holding a dominant market position refuses to grant competitors access to essential inputs, such as technology, data, or distribution systems. Digital platforms often function as gatekeepers[28], as they control infrastructure or data upon which other undertakings must rely in order to provide their services. By refusing to provide access, the platform may prevent competitors from entering or expanding in the market while simultaneously locking in its ecosystem, leaving users and suppliers with no viable alternatives[29].

Second, predatory pricing or pricing intended to eliminate competitors[30]. Predatory pricing is a strategy whereby a large undertaking accepts short-term losses in order to drive competitors out of the market, after which it raises prices to recoup those losses. In digital platform markets, however, identifying predatory pricing is considerably more complex than in traditional markets. First, the marginal cost of digital products is often extremely low, and in some cases the price may even be zero, as in the freemium model[31], making the traditional price-cost test less effective. Second, a distinctive feature of multi-sided platforms is the use of cross-subsidization, whereby the platform offers services free of charge or at very low prices on one side of the market in order to attract users, while recovering its costs from another side of the platform.[32] For example, Facebook provides its social networking services to users entirely free of charge, whereas advertisers pay to reach those users. The case of Amazon is often cited as a representative example of an undertaking that was able to employ a below-cost pricing strategy over an extended period in order to expand its market share and eliminate competition in digital markets[33]. Although Amazon achieved remarkable growth, it generated relatively modest profits, instead choosing to sell products below cost while continuously expanding its operations on a large scale[34].

Third, abuse through forced free riding, whereby a dominant platform exploits its intermediary position and the data obtained from dependent business entities to appropriate their innovations, content, or commercial value, thereby restricting competition[35]. This form of conduct may occur through the collection and use of content generated by dependent business entities. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) examined whether Google’s alleged content scraping constituted an unfair method of competition. Specifically, Google copied content from restaurant review platforms and displayed it in specialized search result boxes. As a result, those competing platforms lost web traffic originating from Google’s search engine, and Google was also alleged to have threatened to remove them from its search results if they objected to the practice. Google subsequently agreed to cease the conduct, and the FTC did not pursue further investigation. Consequently, neither a detailed legal analysis nor the application of the theory of abuse of a dominant market position to this case was clarified in an official decision[36]. Another form of forced free riding involves a platform exploiting data relating to both buyers and sellers in order to introduce its own products or services on the same platform[37]. Abusive conduct may arise where the platform uses its intermediary position, together with its access to vast amounts of data concerning both buyers and sellers, to eliminate or weaken competing undertakings.

Fourth, abusing a dominant market position through self-preferencing. Self-preferencing refers to the practice whereby a platform gives preferential display or promotion to its own products or services over those of other businesses. Examples include manipulating search rankings and using transaction data to promote the platform’s own products[38]. Such practices may have adverse effects on both consumers and sellers. From the perspective of business profitability, however, self-preferencing by platforms may also generate certain efficiencies. Rather than relying on third-party businesses, a platform may manage its own products or services directly, thereby reducing transaction costs, exercising greater quality control, simplifying operational processes, and enabling faster delivery[39]. Although self-preferencing may therefore produce certain benefits, where it is carried out by a dominant platform with the objective of excluding competitors and reinforcing its market position, it may also give rise to significant anti-competitive effects. First, with respect to third-party businesses, the platform may exploit its role as the “rule-maker” to create barriers that make it more difficult for them to compete effectively.[40] For example, in the Google Shopping case (Case AT.39740), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed that Google had given preferential placement to its own comparison shopping service in search results while reducing the visibility and competitive opportunities of comparable third-party services[41].

Fifth, imposing restrictive privacy policies. This refers to the practice whereby an undertaking holding a dominant market position imposes data collection terms on consumers, allowing it to use the collected data across a wide range of contexts. Such an undertaking may leverage the data collected in the market in which it holds a dominant position to expand into a new market with an overlapping user base, even where the products concerned are not directly related in terms of their use. This conduct may be assessed as a form of exclusionary abuse, or as a combination of exclusionary abuse and exploitative abuse, particularly where the undertaking imposes broad data-use terms on consumers[42]. A prominent example is the 2019 decision of the Bundeskartellamt (the German Federal Cartel Office) concerning Meta. The authority found that Meta had abused the dominant position of its social networking service Facebook by requiring users to consent to the combination of their personal data from multiple sources, including Instagram, WhatsApp, and data collected from third-party websites through Facebook’s tracking tools[43].

III. Lessons from Chinese Competition Law and Recommendations for Improving Vietnamese Competition Law

3.1. Chinese Competition Law Governing the Abuse of a Dominant Market Position in Digital Platform Markets

China is one of the world’s largest economies and is home to several leading enterprises in the global digital economy, including Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance (the developer of TikTok). The Chinese government has paid particular attention to both existing and potential abuses of market power in technology markets. Accordingly, China has adopted a series of measures, including the promulgation and implementation of competition regulations governing digital markets, together with the release of related draft regulations[44].

China’s legal framework for addressing the abuse of a dominant market position in digital platform markets consists of a system of legislation and specialized guidelines. The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), enacted in 2007 and amended in 2022, serves as the fundamental legal framework prohibiting the abuse of market dominance and other anti-competitive conduct[45]. Articles 22, 23, and 24 of the AML govern the abuse of a dominant market position. In particular, Article 22 enumerates conduct constituting abuse and includes a general clause authorizing the anti-monopoly authority under the State Council to identify additional forms of abusive conduct[46]. Articles 23 and 24 set out the criteria for determining whether an undertaking holds a dominant market position. In response to the rapid development of digital platforms, China has further strengthened its legislative framework governing anti-monopoly enforcement and the abuse of dominant market positions in digital platform markets[47]. In 2022, at the 35th Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress, amendments to the Anti-Monopoly Law were adopted[48]. Under the amended Law, former Article 17 became Article 22, with the addition of a new paragraph providing that an undertaking holding a dominant market position shall not abuse that position by exploiting data, algorithms, technology, or platform operating rules to engage in any of the abusive conduct specified in the preceding paragraph[49]. This legislative reform reflects a broader shift in China’s regulatory philosophy toward the platform economy: from rapid but weakly regulated expansion to orderly development; from reactive supervision to proactive governance; from fragmented regulation to a systematic regulatory framework; and from a growth model characterized by regulatory tolerance to a more balanced approach that promotes innovation while strengthening regulatory enforcement[50]. In December 2020, the Central Economic Work Conference explicitly emphasized the need to strengthen anti-monopoly enforcement and prevent the disorderly expansion of capital (that is, the excessive and inadequately regulated expansion of businesses through capital accumulation, resulting in market distortions). Subsequently, in February 2021, the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council issued the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy, which emphasize the principle of equal treatment for all market participants and call for the refinement of legal standards for determining dominant market positions in the context of platform undertakings[51]. The Guidelines aim to ensure fair competition in the platform economy, curb the disorderly expansion of capital, and operate within the legal framework of the Anti-Monopoly Law, rather than as an independent legislative instrument[52]. Their objective is to establish a scientific and effective regulatory approach that is consistent with the stage of development, operational characteristics, and market structure of the platform economy, while safeguarding legitimate interests, promoting innovation, and ensuring fair market conditions[53]. The Guidelines are structured into four principal chapters: monopoly agreements, abuse of a dominant market position, concentrations of undertakings, and the abuse of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition. Notably, the Guidelines adopt a broad definition of digital platforms, thereby encompassing various platform-based business models, including major domestic technology companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and Meituan[54]. Accordingly, the practical orientation and principal policy objective of the Guidelines are to establish a comprehensive framework for regulating the conduct of super-platforms through a guidance document of broad application. Although the Guidelines do not explicitly identify any particular company, the business models, market conduct, and use of competitive resources—such as data and algorithms—addressed therein closely reflect the operational practices of these leading platform undertakings[55]. With respect to the definition of the relevant market in digital platform markets, the Chinese competition authority does not rely on the traditional SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test, which examines the effects of a 5–10% price increase, because digital platform products and services are often highly differentiated and competition takes place primarily through service quality, technological innovation, and user experience rather than price. Instead, the authority applies the SSNDQ (Small but Significant Non-transitory Decrease in Quality) test, which assesses users’ responses to a significant and sustained deterioration in service quality. In addition, the assessment of market power takes into account network effects (whereby the platform becomes more valuable as the number of users increases), indirect interactions between different groups of users on the platform (for example, buyers and sellers), and the role of data in data-driven business models. Economies of scale are also considered important, as platforms with large user bases generally enjoy significant competitive advantages. The relevant market may include platforms providing comparable services, such as electronic commerce, food delivery, ride-hailing, or social networking services[56]. This approach has been applied in a number of major enforcement cases, including the proceedings against Alibaba[57]. In addition, China has drawn upon the regulatory approach adopted by the European Union (EU), particularly the Digital Markets Act (DMA), in governing the platform economy. This is reflected in the publication by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) of two draft regulatory instruments at the end of 2021. While the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy primarily focus on ex post supervision, the draft Guidelines on the Classification and Grading of Internet Platforms and the draft Guidelines on the Principal Responsibilities of Internet Platforms adopt a more ex ante regulatory approach[58]. In particular, the Guidelines on the Classification and Grading of Internet Platforms, released in October 2021, proposed a multi-tier classification system for internet platforms based on their functions and market scale. Notably, the draft introduced a quantitative definition of “super-platforms” based on indicators such as: having more than 500 million active domestic users during the preceding year; conducting core business activities in at least two of six major sectors; having a market capitalization or valuation exceeding RMB 1 trillion; and possessing the ability to significantly restrict merchants’ access to end users[59]. The draft Guidelines on the Principal Responsibilities of Internet Platforms, published in November 2021, establish differentiated obligations for different categories of platforms, while imposing more stringent responsibilities on super-platforms[60]. These draft guidelines reflect China’s effort to adopt a risk-based and tiered regulatory approach aimed at proactively controlling the systemic impact of dominant digital platforms. This quantitative approach to identifying regulated platforms bears considerable similarity to the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), which identifies gatekeepers on the basis of criteria reflecting an entrenched market position and systemic influence. Both regulatory models direct their oversight toward very large platforms possessing structural market power and exerting significant influence over the digital ecosystem. An important distinction, however, lies in their legal status: whereas the DMA has been formally adopted and is legally binding throughout the European Union, the two Chinese draft guidelines remain at the public consultation stage and have not yet been formally adopted or implemented.

In addition to the provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the development of the digital economy has increasingly blurred the boundary between the abuse of a dominant market position and unfair competition. In practice, many forms of conduct by digital platforms—such as imposing unreasonable trading conditions, restricting competitors’ access to data, giving preferential treatment to the platform’s own products, or implementing “choose one from two” arrangements—may not only exhibit the characteristics of anti-competitive conduct but also directly undermine fair competition in the market. Accordingly, China has adopted a coordinated enforcement approach combining the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) to enhance the effectiveness of regulating anti-competitive conduct in digital platform markets. On 27 June 2025, China adopted amendments to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL), which entered into force on 15 October 2025. As one of the two principal pillars of China’s competition law framework, alongside the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the AUCL addresses a broad range of unfair business practices, including misleading commercial advertising, commercial bribery, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unlawful conduct in digital markets. While the AML regulates monopoly agreements, the abuse of a dominant market position, concentrations of undertakings, and competition restrictions arising from administrative authorities, the AUCL performs a complementary role by targeting deceptive and anti-competitive practices that fall outside the scope of traditional antitrust law[61]. The 2025 amendments to the AUCL significantly expanded and updated its regulatory scope to address emerging challenges in both traditional and digital markets. In particular, the scope of regulated conduct was extended from the use of technical means to include activities based on data, algorithms, and platform rules, thereby aligning the legal framework more closely with the realities of platform governance and algorithm-driven business models[62]. The AUCL further provides that business operators shall not use data, algorithms, technology, platform rules, or other similar means to influence users’ choices or employ other methods to interfere with or disrupt the normal operation of online products or services lawfully provided by other business operators[63]. Accordingly, the AUCL serves as a complementary enforcement instrument for addressing conduct that does not satisfy the legal threshold for constituting an abuse of a dominant market position but nevertheless harms competition in digital platform markets.

The regulated conduct includes: First, unlawful data collection. For the first time, the AUCL explicitly prohibits the unlawful collection or use of data lawfully held by other business operators through illicit means, such as circumventing technical protection measures. This represents an important development for companies that rely on data aggregation, automated data collection (scraping), or competitive intelligence analysis, while also aligning with China’s broader policy direction of clarifying commercial data rights. One of the key additions to the 2025 revision of the AUCL is Article 13(4), which expressly prohibits the unfair collection and use of data lawfully held by other business operators: “Business operators shall not collect or use data lawfully held by other business operators through fraudulent or coercive means, or by circumventing or damaging technical management measures, nor shall they impair the lawful rights and interests of other business operators or disrupt market competition”[64].

Second, abuse of platform rules and malicious interference with transactions: Article 13(4) provides: “Business operators shall not abuse platform rules to directly engage in, or instruct others to engage in, fraudulent transactions, fabricated reviews, or malicious returns, thereby impairing the lawful rights and interests of other business operators and disrupting market competition.” This provision reflects an increasingly common phenomenon in China’s e-commerce sector, where competition has become highly intense. To gain market share, many platforms adopt aggressive policies to attract and retain users, such as expedited refund services or convenient return mechanisms. Platforms also use merchants’ ratings, transaction credibility, and return rates as input data for algorithms that determine merchants’ visibility and rankings. Some competitors have exploited these mechanisms to disadvantage their rivals, for example by placing fake orders, posting fabricated reviews to trigger platform-imposed penalties, or artificially inflating return rates through bulk purchases followed by returns. Unlike traditional forms of reputational harm, these practices turn the platform’s control systems into tools for restricting competitors’ visibility and disrupting their normal business operations[65].

Third, compelling merchants to sell below cost. Article 14 of the 2025 AUCL introduces a new provision addressing a persistent concern in China’s platform economy: “Platform operators shall not compel or indirectly compel merchants on the platform to sell products below cost pursuant to the platform’s pricing rules, thereby disrupting market competition.” This provision is intended to curb a form of excessive competition in which platforms, in pursuit of traffic or increased market share, exert pressure on merchants to reduce prices to unsustainable levels. Common practices include algorithm-driven price reductions, automatic price matching at lower prices, and requirements for products to be labeled as offering the “lowest price on the internet.” These practices distort fair competition, erode profit margins, and ultimately undermine product quality and market diversity[66].

By prohibiting the imposition of below-cost pricing, the 2025 revision reinforces the AUCL’s fundamental principle that market competition should be based on product quality, innovation, and services rather than destructive price wars. However, this provision is narrowly tailored to preserve commercial flexibility and avoid overregulation. It applies only where all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the platform compels the merchant, for example by changing prices without the merchant’s consent or imposing sanctions for non-compliance; (2) the selling price is genuinely below cost, rather than merely yielding a low profit margin or breaking even; and (3) the conduct disrupts market competition, rather than merely affecting the pricing decisions of individual merchants[67]. This regulatory approach reflects the legislature’s effort to strike a balance between, on the one hand, curbing the abuse of pricing power and, on the other hand, preserving room for platforms and business operators to implement lawful promotional strategies within the bounds of legitimate commercial practices.

With respect to sanctions, the new provisions of the AUCL substantially increase the maximum penalties, reflecting a trend toward more robust enforcement. Specifically, fines of up to RMB 5 million may be imposed for acts of unfair competition in the digital environment under Article 13; up to RMB 2 million for compelling merchants to sell below cost or imposing “choose one from two” arrangements under Article 14; and up to RMB 5 million for the continued abuse of a superior bargaining position under Article 15[68]. These changes reflect a new policy direction aimed at strengthening deterrence and promoting compliance by design, while encouraging business operators to enhance their internal control systems and proactively cooperate with regulatory authorities to minimize legal risks.

It can be seen from the above legal frameworks that China regards the development of the digital platform economy as both an important driver of innovation and a source of potential systemic risks. Rather than applying a rigid or uniform legal framework to all cases involving enterprises with a dominant market position, Chinese regulators define the limits of platform power through case-specific enforcement and a flexible regulatory approach. This is because fixed legal rules risk becoming obsolete as technology and business models continue to evolve, resulting in regulatory measures that are no longer appropriate and may adversely affect the development of emerging enterprises.

3.2. Recommendations for Viet Nam

China’s experience demonstrates that controlling the abuse of a dominant market position on digital platforms cannot rely on the traditional competition law model, which is primarily based on price, market share, and the boundaries of physical markets. The development of the digital economy, characterized by multi-sided markets, data dependence, network effects, and algorithmic decision-making, has fundamentally changed the nature of market competition, requiring Viet Nam’s competition law to be refined in a manner that is more flexible and better suited to the distinctive characteristics of the digital environment. On this basis, several directions for improving Vietnamese law may be proposed as follows:

First, the legal provisions on defining the relevant market in the digital platform environment should be further refined. At present, the Law on Competition 2018 and its implementing regulations are still primarily based on the theoretical foundations of traditional markets, under which the definition of the relevant market mainly relies on substitutability in terms of price and the characteristics of goods and services. Clause 6, Article 3 of the Law on Competition 2018 provides: “Relevant market means a market of goods or services that are substitutable in terms of characteristics, intended use, and price within a specific geographic area where competitive conditions are similar and significantly distinguishable from those in adjacent geographic areas”[69]. Pursuant to Decree No. 35/2020/ND-CP, the relevant market is determined by identifying both the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The competition authority assesses the substitutability of goods and services based on their characteristics, intended use, price, and consumers’ responses to price changes, while also considering the ability of other enterprises to switch to supplying similar products. With respect to the relevant geographic market, the determination is based on areas with comparable competitive conditions, taking into account such factors as transportation costs, barriers to market entry, consumer practices, and legal regulations. The outcome of this process is the identification of the market within which enterprises actually compete with one another, providing the basis for calculating market shares and assessing market power[70].

However, this approach reveals significant limitations when applied to digital platforms, where many services are provided free of charge and competition primarily takes place through data, traffic, and the ability to maintain a user ecosystem. Therefore, Vietnamese law should incorporate sector-specific criteria for defining the relevant market in the digital economy, including network effects, the degree of data dependence, users’ ability to switch between platforms, the degree of control over traffic, and the interactions among different user groups in multi-sided markets. Drawing on China’s experience, Viet Nam may adopt the SSNDQ (Small but Significant Non-transitory Decrease in Quality) test to define the relevant market. SSNDQ is a method used in competition law to define the relevant market, particularly in digital markets or markets where price is not the primary dimension of competition. This method examines whether a hypothetical monopolist could impose a small but significant non-transitory decrease in the quality of a product or service while still retaining its customers. If consumers switch in significant numbers to other products or services following the reduction in quality, those products or services are considered substitutable and therefore belong to the same relevant market. Conversely, if customers continue to use the product despite the reduction in quality, the relevant market may be defined more narrowly. The SSNDQ test is regarded as a complement to the SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price) test. While the SSNIP test is suitable for traditional markets, where price is the primary parameter of competition, the SSNDQ test is particularly useful for digital platforms, social media platforms, search engines, and free online services, where users do not pay directly. In such cases, service quality, the level of personal data protection, processing speed, content visibility, and user experience are often more important competitive parameters than price.

Second, the approach to assessing the dominant market position of digital platform enterprises should be reformed. Under Article 24 of the Law on Competition 2018, an enterprise is deemed to hold a dominant market position if it possesses significant market power or has a market share of 30% or more in the relevant market[71]. In addition, Article 26 provides that significant market power shall be determined on the basis of various factors, including relative market share, financial strength, barriers to market entry, the ability to control distribution systems or sources of supply, technological advantages, intellectual property rights, and sector-specific characteristics of the relevant industry or business[72].

However, in the context of the digital economy, the current criteria reveal certain limitations. Although Article 26 permits consideration of technological advantages and sector-specific characteristics, these provisions remain general in nature and have not been specifically tailored to digital platform markets. In practice, many platform enterprises may not reach the market share threshold under the traditional method of calculation, yet still possess significant market power by virtue of their ability to control user data, operate distribution algorithms, leverage network effects, and create high switching costs for users and business partners. Therefore, if the assessment relies solely on traditional criteria or lacks guidance on evaluating the distinctive features of the digital environment, the competition authority may encounter difficulties in accurately identifying the dominant market position of platform enterprises. China’s experience demonstrates that determining dominance in digital platform markets requires an assessment that goes beyond the traditional criterion of revenue-based market share. The Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy Sector require consideration of such factors as user scale, data control, network effects, the degree of user lock-in, the ability to control traffic, and the ability of other market participants to access the market. These factors more accurately reflect the nature of market power in the digital environment, where data and the ability to connect different groups of users have become critical competitive resources.

Drawing on these experiences, Viet Nam should continue to refine the implementing provisions of Articles 24 and 26 by incorporating specific criteria for assessing the market power of digital platform enterprises. In particular, the law should expressly require consideration of the number of active users, the degree of dependence of businesses and consumers on the platform, the ability to collect and exploit data, network effects, switching costs, the degree of algorithmic control, and access to data or essential digital infrastructure. At the same time, the multi-sided market approach should be formally recognized in competition law enforcement to ensure a comprehensive assessment of the competitive relationships that occur simultaneously among different groups of users on the same platform. Refining these criteria will contribute to more effectively identifying enterprises holding a dominant market position, thereby providing a solid legal basis for controlling the abuse of market power in the digital economy.

Third, specific provisions should be introduced to directly regulate abusive practices on digital platforms based on data and algorithms. This orientation has been initially recognized in the Law on E-Commerce 2025 through the establishment of transparency obligations and management responsibilities for e-commerce platform operators. Specifically, Article 15 requires platform operators to disclose the key selection criteria used when applying algorithms or measures to restrict or prioritize the display of goods and services[73]. For large digital platforms, Article 17 further requires them to provide competent state authorities with transaction data and descriptions of algorithms, including their design, logic, and operational mechanisms related to conduct showing signs of legal violations[74]. These provisions indicate that Vietnamese law has initially recognized the role of data and algorithms as factors capable of creating and maintaining market power in the digital environment. However, the Law on E-Commerce 2025 primarily adopts an approach from the perspective of platform governance and consumer protection, while the Law on Competition still lacks specific provisions for addressing abuses of market power through data and algorithms. Meanwhile, China’s experience demonstrates that amending the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) to directly incorporate conduct involving the use of data, algorithms, and platform rules to restrict competition has provided a clearer legal basis for enforcement. Therefore, the Law on Competition should continue to be refined by explicitly regulating practices such as self-preferencing, manipulation of display results, algorithmic discrimination, restricting competitors’ access to data, or exploiting user data to disadvantage business operators dependent on platforms. The introduction of these provisions will contribute to establishing a more comprehensive legal basis for controlling abuses of dominant market positions in the digital economy, while ensuring consistency between competition law and e-commerce law.

Fourth, Viet Nam has currently established a sanctioning mechanism for abuses of dominant market positions and monopoly positions. Under Decree No. 75/2019/ND-CP, violating enterprises may be subject to a fine ranging from 1% to 10% of their total revenue in the relevant market in the fiscal year immediately preceding the year in which the violation was committed for acts such as imposing unreasonable prices, restricting production or distribution, applying discriminatory trading conditions, preventing other enterprises from entering or expanding in the market, or imposing unfavorable trading conditions. In addition to monetary fines, enterprises may also be subject to confiscation of profits obtained from the violation and remedial measures, such as removing violating clauses from contracts, restoring competitive conditions, or restructuring the enterprise[75].

However, the current sanctions are primarily designed for traditional forms of abuse and do not fully reflect new forms of abuse in the digital environment based on data and algorithms. In addition, the current enforcement mechanism remains more focused on addressing consequences after violations occur rather than preventing them at an early stage. China’s experience in strengthening sanctions and emphasizing ex ante control mechanisms demonstrates the importance of deterrence and prevention mechanisms.

Therefore, Viet Nam should consider introducing specialized sanctions for abusive conduct based on data, algorithms, and control over digital platforms, particularly with respect to platforms holding dominant market positions or serving as market intermediaries. In addition, Viet Nam should draw on China’s experience to establish an ex ante control mechanism, under which large digital platforms would be required to establish internal competition law compliance programs, conduct periodic assessments of the competitive impacts of algorithms, and report significant changes to mechanisms for content display, ranking, or data distribution.

At the same time, the mechanism for commitments and voluntary remedies should be further improved, allowing enterprises to proactively terminate abusive conduct and restore competitive conditions before competent authorities issue official sanctioning decisions. This approach would not only enhance the effectiveness of competition law enforcement but also facilitate the early detection and prevention of abusive practices in the digital economy.

Finally, an important lesson from China’s experience is the transition from a reactive regulatory model to a proactive yet flexible governance model in competition law enforcement. Previously, regulators generally intervened only after violations had occurred and caused significant impacts on the market. However, in the digital economy, this approach reveals significant limitations because the pace of development of technology, data, and digital platforms is much faster than the process of investigating and handling violations. China has shifted toward a proactive governance model through the issuance of sector-specific guidelines for digital platforms, enhanced supervision of large technology enterprises, requirements for assessing the competitive impacts of algorithms, and the application of early warning mechanisms to identify potential violations before consequences occur. At the same time, this proactive approach remains within a flexible framework, as demonstrated by the use of commitment mechanisms, voluntary remedies, dialogue with enterprises, and policy adjustments in response to rapid changes in technology markets. For Viet Nam, the transition from a reactive regulatory model to proactive yet flexible governance should be implemented through a roadmap appropriate to the level of development of the digital economy and the enforcement capacity of the competition authority. First, a regular monitoring mechanism should be established for digital platforms with significant market power through periodic reporting obligations concerning user data, major algorithmic changes affecting competition, and policies on the display and ranking of products or services. Second, the competition authority should develop a digital competition risk assessment system to identify early signs of abuse, such as self-preferencing of platform products, algorithmic discrimination, or restrictions on competitors’ access to data. Third, the mechanism for commitments and voluntary remedies should be further improved, allowing enterprises to proactively adjust their conduct, modify algorithms, or remove competition-restricting clauses before competent state authorities apply formal sanctions.

IV. Conclusion

The rapid development of the digital economy has increased the role and market power of digital platforms while posing new challenges for competition law in controlling abuses of dominant market positions. Through an analysis of the theoretical foundations, the current legal framework, and China’s practical experience in regulating platform enterprises, this article demonstrates the importance of improving the competition law system to adapt to the distinctive characteristics of digital markets. On this basis, the article proposes several orientations for Viet Nam, including improving legal provisions on the definition of relevant markets and dominant market positions in the digital environment, enhancing the effectiveness of competition law enforcement, and strengthening the governance of emerging factors such as data and algorithms. These solutions contribute to ensuring a healthy competitive environment while promoting the sustainable development of the digital economy in Viet Nam.

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This study is part of a university-level research project funded by the University of Economics – The University of Danang, with the project code T2026-04-02.

* PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Economics, The University of Danang; accepted for publication on June 29, 2026.

** MA, Faculty of Law, University of Economics, The University of Danang. Email: thuy.ltb@due.edu.vn.

[1] Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community.(1957). Article 86.

[2] Case 6-72, Europemballage Corporation and
Continental Can Company Inc v Commission of the European Communities (ECJ
1973).

[3] Vijay
Kumar Singh, Competition Law:
Dominant Position and Its Abuse: Abuse of Dominant Position in US and EU.
(2017).

[4] Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission of
the European Communities (European Court of Justice 1979).

[5] UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, the Model Law on Competition of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is an international set of guiding rules that provides a reference legal framework to assist countries, particularly developing countries, in establishing or improving their national competition laws. This document includes provisions on restrictive agreements, abuse of monopoly/dominant positions, and merger control. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION (2010), available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdrbpconf7d8_exerpt_en.pdf.

[6] Point (b), Paragraph I, Chapter 2. Original text: “(b) ‘Dominant position of market power’ refers to a situation where an enterprise, either by itself or acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to control the relevant market for a particular good or service or group of goods or services.”

[7] United States Congress, Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, National Archives (1890),
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/sherman-anti-trust-act.

[8] Singh,
supra note 3.

[9] Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article
22 https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=39637&lib=law&EncodingName=big5
(last visited Mar. 5, 2026).

[10] Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, supra note 9.

[11] Federal Law No. 135-FZ on Protection of
Competition, July 26, 2006, as amended by Federal Law No. 344-FZ, Oct. 14, 2024
(Russ.). of 2006, 135-FZ. Article 5 (1)

[12] National Assembly, Law on Competition 2018 (Promulgated on June 12, 2018, No. 23/2018/QH14) (2018).

[13] United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), Model Law on Competition (2010) – Chapter IV: Acts or
Behaviour Constituting an Abuse of a Dominant Position of Market Power3
(2010).

[14] Id.

[15] Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission
of the European Communities.

[16] Id.

[17] National Assembly, supra note 13, Clause 5, Article 3.

[18] Id.

[19] Annabelle Gawer, Digital Platforms and
Ecosystems: Remarks on the Dominant Organizational Forms of the Digital Age,
24 Innovation 110 (2022),
https://doi.org/10.1080/14479338.2021.1965888.

[20] Daniele Schilirò, Digital Platforms and
Digital Transformation, No. 118006 MPRA
Pap. (2023), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/118006.

[21] S. Choudary, Marshall W. van Alstyne &
Geoffrey G. Parker, Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are
Transforming the Economy–and How to Make Them Work for You (2016),
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Platform-Revolution%3A-How-Networked-Markets-Are-the-Choudary-Alstyne/108041751271defd1ec505ffb93b2ec598d434f8.

[22] Multi-Sided Perspectives on Multi-Sided
Markets | Canadian Bar Association,
https://cba.org/sections/competition-law-and-foreign-investment-review/member-articles/multi-sided-perspectives-on-multi-sided-markets/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2026).

[23] Clause 2, Article 3 of the Law on E-Commerce, Law No. 122/2025/QH15.

[24] Clause 3, Article 3 of the same law.

[25] Clause 4, Article 3 of the same law.

[26] Clause 1, Article 11 of the same law.

[27] Clause 2, Article 17 of the same law.

[28] “Gatekeeper”: The term “gatekeeper,” as defined by the European Commission (EC), refers to large technology corporations operating one or more core platform services (CPS). These CPS are also identified by the EC based on user scale, the volume of data generated and processed, as well as their impact on digital markets and consumers. These 23 CPS include web browsers, social networking platforms, voice assistants, search engines, operating systems, video platforms, and more. By providing core platform services, intermediary service providers act as important gateways enabling businesses to reach end users. They collect and manage vast amounts of user data, control access to widely used and considered essential services, and are capable of leveraging their position to hinder competition and innovation. Gatekeepers have the ability to shape the online landscape and influence the success of businesses operating within it. With their extensive reach and massive user base, gatekeepers have become key players in digital markets.

[29] OECD,
Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets
(2021), https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets_4c36b455-en.html.

[30] Predatory pricing: refers to a practice whereby enterprises with market power set the prices of their products at excessively low levels for a sufficiently long period of time in order to eliminate competitors from the market and/or prevent new competitors from entering the market. After achieving the objective of deterring or eliminating competitors, the enterprise will significantly increase prices to recover the losses incurred and the profits forgone due to the reduction of competition in the market.

[31] Freemium is a term formed by combining the two words “free” and “premium”. It refers to a business model that provides users with basic features of a product or service free of charge. However, the company subsequently charges fees for additional or advanced features depending on users’ needs.

[32] OECD,
supra note 30.

[33] Stapp Kristian Stout, Is Amazon Guilty of
Predatory Pricing?, Truth on the
Market (May 7, 2019),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/05/07/is-amazon-guilty-of-predatory-pricing/.

[34]
Id.

[35] Howard Shelanski, Information, Innovation,
and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 Univ. Pa. Law Rev. 1663 (2013),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol161/iss6/6.

[36] Id.

[37] Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox (Jan. 31,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2911742.

[38] Yuta Kittaka, Susumu Sato & Yusuke Zennyo, Self-Preferencing
by Platforms: A Literature Review, 66 Jpn.
World Econ. 101191 (2023),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0922142523000178.

[39] XuRui Wang, SELF-PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF
DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND ITS ANTI-MONOPOLY REGULATION, 3 World J. Sociol. Law (2025),
http://www.upubscience.com/News11Detail.aspx?id=1489&proid=51.

[40] Id.

[41] Eva Fischer, Lena Hornkohl & Nils Imgarten,
Discriminatory Leveraging Plus: The Standard for Independent
Self-Preferencing Abuses after Google Shopping (C-48/22 P), 2025 10 Eur. Pap. – J. Law Integr. 25 (2025),
https://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/e-journal/discriminatory-leveraging-plus-standard-independent-self-preferencing-abuses-after-google-shopping.

[42] Daniele Condorelli & Jorge Padilla, Harnessing
Platform Envelopment in the Digital World (2019),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3504025.

[43] Stapp, supra note 34.

[44] Juan Pablo, CeCo | Antimonopoly regulation
of digital platforms in China, (Mar. 15, 2023),
https://centrocompetencia.com/anti-monopoly-regulation-of-digital-platforms-in-china/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[45] China Law Translate, Anti-Monopoly Law (2022
Edition), China Law Translate
(June 27, 2022), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/anti-monopoly-law-2022/.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Qing Lisha, How China and the European Union
Regulate the Abuse of Market Dominance in the Platform Economy (LUND
UNIVERSITY),
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=9194723&fileOId=9194724.

[51] Guidelines for Anti-Monopoly in the Platform
Economy of 2020.

[52] Id.

[53] Id.

[54] Id.

[55] Lisha, supra note 51.

[56]
[CSL STYLE ERROR: reference with no printed form.].

[57]
SAMR Imposed Record Fine on Alibaba for Abuse of Dominant Position,
https://cms.law/en/chn/legal-updates/SAMR-Imposed-Record-Fine-on-Alibaba-for-Abuse-of-Dominant-Position
(last visited June 1, 2026).

[58] Pablo, supra note 45.

[59] Translation: Guidelines for Internet
Platform Categorization and Grading (Draft for Comment) – Oct. 2021, DigiChina,
https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/translation-guidelines-for-internet-platform-categorization-and-grading-draft-for-comment-oct-2021/
(last visited Sept. 8, 2025).

[60] Guidelines for Internet Platforms to Fulfill Primary Responsibilities (Draft for Public Consultation) – National Unified Social Credit Information Data Service Center, https://www.cods.org.cn/c/2021-10-29/15261.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2025).

[61] China Updates Its Anti-Unfair Competition
Law to Address “Involutionary” Competition and Abuses of Superior Bargaining
Power, JD Supra, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-updates-its-anti-unfair-5905605/
(last visited Sept. 10, 2025).

[62] Beijing Dacheng Law Offices LLP- JetDeng &
KenDai, China Updates Its Anti-Unfair Competition Law to Address
“Involutionary” Competition and Abuses of Superior Bargaining Power, Lexology (Aug. 8, 2025),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1601e9a6-12e9-41ca-ad80-c17021ab4a6d.

[63] Aaron Wininger, China’s National People’s
Congress Passes Amended Anti-Unfair Competition Law, China IP Law Update (June 27, 2025),
https://www.chinaiplawupdate.com/2025/06/chinas-national-peoples-congress-passes-amended-anti-unfair-competition-law/.

[64] Id.

[65] JetDeng and KenDai, supra note 63.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Wininger, supra note 64.

[69] National Assembly, supra note 13.

[70] Articles 3 and 4 of Decree No. 35/2020/ND-CP detailing a number of articles of the Law on Competition.

[71] Article 24, National Assembly, supra note 13.

[72] Article 26, Id.

[73] Clause 1, Article 15 of the Law on E-Commerce.

[74] Clause 3, Article 17 of Law No. 122/2025/QH15.

[75] Articles 8 and 9 of Decree No. 75/2019/ND-CP prescribing penalties for administrative violations against regulations on competition.